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Modulation of Caudate Activity
by Action Contingency
wards and punishments that were simply presented at
pseudorandom intervals. While an array of functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have found
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that secondary reinforcers such as money can activateUniversity of Pittsburgh
reward-related brain regions (Breiter et al., 2001; Del-Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15260
gado et al., 2000, 2003; Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson et2 Center for the Neural Basis of Cognition
al., 2000, 2001a, 2001b; O’Doherty et al., 2001), thesePittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
studies have not examined the extent to which the dorsal3 Department of Psychology
and ventral striatum are activated in response to dis-New York University
plays indicating monetary rewards and punishmentsNew York, New York 10003
presented unpredictably in time. However, there is evi-
dence that randomly presented primary rewards elicit
striatal activation. Electrophysiological recording stud-Summary
ies in monkeys have shown that unpredicted primary
rewards cause activity of dopaminergic neurons in theResearch has increasingly implicated the striatum in
substantia nigra and ventral tegmental area (Schultz etthe processing of reward-related information in both
al., 1997), and these neurons project to dorsal and ven-animals and humans. However, it is unclear whether
tral striatum, respectively (Haber and Fudge, 1997). Inhuman striatal activation is driven solely by the he-
addition, an fMRI study using human subjects found andonic properties of rewards or whether such activation
enhancement of activity in the ventral striatum whenis reliant on other factors, such as anticipation of up-
primary liquid rewards were presented in an unpredict-coming reward or performance of an action to earn a
able, rather than a predictable, manner (Berns et al.,reward. We used event-related functional magnetic
2001). Activity in dorsal striatum, however, was not re-resonance imaging to investigate hemodynamic re-
ported in this experiment.sponses to monetary rewards and punishments in
To understand how the striatum reacts to unpredict-three experiments that made use of an oddball para-
able rewards and punishments, we used an oddball par-digm. We presented reward and punishment displays
adigm in which a meaningless standard habituatingrandomly in time, following an anticipatory cue, or
stimulus (a purple square) was repeatedly presented,following a button press response. Robust and differ-
interrupted with infrequent oddball stimuli indicatingential activation of the caudate nucleus occurred only
monetary gain or loss (Figure 1). This design allowed uswhen a perception of contingency existed between the
to present reward and punishment displays at varyingbutton press response and the outcome. This finding
intervals. Oddball paradigms have been used exten-suggests that the caudate is involved in reinforcement
sively in ERP experiments (Courchesne et al., 1975;of action potentially leading to reward, rather than in
Johnson, 1986; Sutton et al., 1965) and more recentlyprocessing reward per se.
in fMRI experiments (Kiehl and Liddle, 2003; McCarthy
et al., 1997; Menon et al., 1997; Strange et al., 2000). WithIntroduction
this type of paradigm, the repeating standard stimulus
presentations serve as a baseline, against which activityThe subjective experience of receiving a reward or pun-
elicited by the oddballs can be compared.ishment is complex. Not only do rewards induce feelings
In our first experiment, each of our oddball stimuli
of pleasure, but they also serve as positive reinforcers
could be one of three items: a green upward arrow, indicat-
of behavior (Schultz et al., 1998). Therefore, the brain
ing a monetary reward, a red downward arrow, indicating
must be sensitive to the hedonic nature of rewards while a monetary loss, or a sideways blue arrow, indicating
also associating behavior with the outcomes it pro- a neutral trial. These oddball stimuli were presented
duces. Previous research in both animals (Hikosaka et pseudorandomly once every 10.5–19.5 s. This variable
al., 1989; Schultz et al., 1998) and humans (Delgado et intertrial interval minimized time-locked anticipation of
al., 2000; Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2000) has when the reward or punishment would occur. Subjects
shown that the striatum is important for processing re- were instructed to press a button upon seeing any of
ward-related information. Yet activity in the human stria- the arrows. Subjects knew that this response did not
tum has primarily been observed during tasks in which affect the outcome, since this action occurred after the
rewards and punishments were contingent upon a cog- onset of the reward or punishment display.
nitive decision or a motor response. It is not clear Our second goal was to determine whether time-
whether the resulting striatal response is driven solely locked anticipation of the reward or punishment would
by the existence of a reward or punishment, or whether drive a striatal response. Anticipation of an upcoming
other aspects of the task contribute to or are necessary reward has previously been shown to affect activity in
for the occurrence of such a response. reward-related brain regions. When conditioned stimuli
Our first goal was to determine whether the striatum predict an upcoming reward, the firing of dopamine neu-
would respond to feedback indicating monetary re- rons occurs after the reward-predicting stimulus, rather
than after the reward itself (Schultz et al., 1997). Human
fMRI experiments have shown both dorsal and ventral*Correspondence: elt6@pitt.edu
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Figure 1. Experimental Design
Top: In Experiment 1, a habituating stimulus (a purple square) was displayed once every 1500 ms for a duration of 500 ms, interrupted
psuedorandomly every 10.5–19.5 s with an oddball stimulus, which was an upward green arrow, a downward red arrow, or a sideways blue
arrow. The green arrow indicated a reward of $1.50, the red arrow indicated a punishment of $0.75, and the blue arrow indicated no money
won or lost. Subjects were instructed to push the index finger button on the response glove upon seeing each arrow. Functional images were
acquired every 1.5 s, and for each trial, the first seven of these 1.5 s time periods (beginning with the onset of the oddball stimulus) were analyzed.
Middle: The task for Experiment 2 proceeded much as in Experiment 1, but was modified such that for half the trials, an anticipatory cue (a
yellow circle) preceded the oddball stimulus by 3.0 s. This circle provided no information about the outcome valence. Neutral trials were not
included in this experiment. Subjects were again instructed to push the index finger button upon seeing each arrow. For each trial, the first
nine 1.5 s time periods, beginning 3.0 s before the onset of the arrow stimuli (i.e., at the onset of the anticipatory cue, when present),
were analyzed.
Bottom: For Experiment 3, all arrows were preceded by an anticipatory cue 3 s before the onset of the arrow stimulus. For half of the trials,
the cue was a blue circle, and subjects were instructed to push the thumb button upon seeing this cue. For the other half of the trials, the
cue was a yellow circle, and subjects were instructed to choose between pushing the first and second finger buttons and were told that their
button presses determined the valence of the outcome. In actuality, the outcome valence was predetermined. For each trial, the first ten 1.5 s
time periods (beginning with the onset of the anticipatory cue) were analyzed.
striatal activity during anticipation of reward (Breiter et ment to continue the experiment (Schultz et al., 2000).
In other studies done in monkeys, caudate neurons firedal., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001a; O’Doherty et al., 2003).
To more fully compare activation caused by anticipated in anticipation of a cue or target requiring a visual sac-
cade only when saccades to the neurons’ preferred lo-and unanticipated monetary rewards, we performed a
second experiment. Trials like those in Experiment 1, in cation would be rewarded (Lauwereyns et al., 2002b;
Takikawa et al., 2002). Human fMRI tasks have alsowhich rewards and punishments were not predicted,
were intermingled with trials in which an anticipatory found the caudate nucleus to be active during reward-
related tasks in which subjects believed that their perfor-cue (a yellow circle) preceded the reward or punishment
by 3 s (Figure 1). Subjects did not respond to the cue, mance determined the outcome. For example, bilateral
caudate activity was found in gambling-like tasks inbut responded to the arrows, as in Experiment 1.
Finally, we explored a third possibility, that striatal which subjects thought that their button presses deter-
mined whether they won or lost money (Delgado et al.,activity may be modulated by the perceived connection
between action and outcome. Studies in both monkeys 2000, 2003; Elliott et al., 2000). Similarly, Knutson and
colleagues (2001b) found bilateral caudate and ventraland humans suggest that this perception might be espe-
cially important for driving activity in the dorsal striatum. striatal activity when subjects anticipated a monetary
reward that would occur if they successfully hit a buttonElectrophysiological recordings in monkeys in the cau-
date nucleus, a key structure in the dorsal striatum, during the display of a briefly presented target. While
these tasks did not dissociate the perception of contin-suggest that its activity may be dependent on the antici-
pated consequence of the monkey’s performance (Hiko- gency between action and outcome from other aspects
of the tasks, they stand in contrast to other experimentssaka et al., 1989; Kawagoe et al., 1998; Lauwereyns
et al., 2002a, 2002b; Rolls, 1999; Schultz et al., 2000). in which monetary rewards and punishments were not
linked to subjects’ actions, and dorsal striatal activityCaudate neurons show selective activation for trials in
which a monkey’s movement will result in a reward, as was not reported (Breiter et al., 2001).
A third experiment was performed to examine thisopposed to trials in which the monkey is cued that a
reward will not be delivered but must make the move- issue directly, again by taking advantage of the oddball
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ward than neutral displays [t(5)  3.4, p  0.05]. For
Table 1. Behavioral Data: Reaction Times across Conditions and
Experiment 2, a two-way ANOVA, with cue conditionExperiments
and valence (reward versus punishment) as factors,
Number of Errors Reaction Time showed no significant valence differences in reaction
(Mean  SD) (ms; Mean  SD)
time but did reveal that responses to cued trials were
Experiment 1a faster than to uncued trials [F(1,11)  33.0, p  0.05].
A two-tailed t test on the data for the choice versus no-Reward 4  9 565  215
Punishment 5  10 588  199 choice conditions in Experiment 3 found no significant
Neutral 3  8 606  207 difference. Since the subjects responded prior to seeing
the outcome in Experiment 3, differences between va-Experiment 2b
lence conditions were not examined.
Cued reward 1  1 338  120
To see whether subjects’ subjective experiences wereCued punishment 2  3 348  130
different in the choice versus the no-choice conditionsUncued reward 1  3 484  80
in Experiment 3, a brief Likert-scale questionnaire wasUncued punishment 1  2 499  76
administered at the end of the experiment. Table 2 sum-
Experiment 3
marizes the responses from the questionnaire. Although
Choice 2  2 775  173 the outcomes were fixed and pseudorandomly ordered
No-choice 1  1 726  117 for both choice and no-choice conditions, subjects rated
a Due to a data logging error, behavioral data were not collected their sense of control significantly higher in the choice
for five of the subjects. In addition, the data shown here includes condition than in the no-choice condition [t(8)  4.4,
behavioral data from one subject who missed 66 of the 144 trials p 0.05, two-tailed]. Their degree of certainty that there
(each of the other subjects made fewer than 5 errors). While this is
was a pattern to correct answers was also higher formost likely due to responses only registering intermittently, these
the choice than no-choice conditions [t(8)  3.4, p trials have been omitted from the fMRI analysis, as were any no-
0.05, two-tailed]. While subjects rated how much theyresponse trials from the other subjects.
b Behavioral data from one subject were not collected due to a data cared about winning and losing money as higher in the
logging error. choice condition than the no-choice condition, this trend
was not significant [t(8)  2.1, p  0.1, two-tailed].
Functional Imaging Dataparadigm. In this version of the task, we compared activ-
ity resulting from action-contingent and noncontingent Signal Change in the Caudate Nucleus
Based on previous fMRI experiments (Delgado et al.,rewards and punishments. An anticipatory cue pre-
ceded each reward or punishment by 3 s, and subjects 2000, 2003), we had an a priori interest in the response
of the caudate nucleus across our three experiments.responded to the cue rather than to the arrow that fol-
lowed it. The cue was one of two types, which were Therefore, for each experiment, we performed an ANOVA
on the voxels corresponding to the Talairach coordi-pseudorandomly intermixed. A light blue circle indicated
that the subjects should respond by hitting the thumb nates for the peak activation reported in the left and
right caudate nucleus in previously published work frombutton on the response glove; they were told that in this
condition they had no control over which type of arrow our laboratory (Delgado et al., 2000). These coordinates
were (x12, y 15, z 7) for the left caudate nucleuswould follow the cue. However, when the cue was a
yellow circle, subjects were told to guess whether the and (x 11, y  16, z  7) for the right caudate nucleus
(Talairach and Tournoux, 1988). While the size of ourfirst or second finger key was the “right answer,” and
that whether they won or lost money on these trials individual voxels is 3.75  3.75  3.8 mm3, the size of
the analyzed area is actually somewhat greater thanwould depend on whether they guessed correctly. Un-
beknownst to the subjects, the outcomes were actually this due to the smoothing of the functional image data
(Cohen et al., 2002). This analysis allowed us to takepredetermined. In this way, we were able to selectively
manipulate perceived contingency between action and advantage of methodological and technical similarities
(e.g., analysis pathway, scanner) with our previous workoutcome, while keeping other aspects of the task con-
stant. to predict where activation might occur, while using a
very conservative approach to assess significance in
each experiment. For all three experiments, valence andResults
time period were within-subjects factors; additionally,
cue condition was a within-subjects factor for Experi-Behavioral Data
Error and reaction time data from subjects’ button press ment 2 (cued versus uncued) and Experiment 3 (choice
versus no-choice). As shown in Figure 1, for Experimentresponses are shown in Table 1. No-response errors
were kept to a minimum by informing subjects that if 1 the time periods used were the first seven 1.5 s time
periods of each trial (T1–T7), beginning with the arrowthey failed to respond on any given trial, they would
automatically lose $1.00. Error rates were generally low, stimulus; for Experiment 2, the first nine 1.5 s time peri-
ods of each trial were used (T1–T9), beginning 3 s beforeindicating that the subjects were attending to the task
in each experiment. A one-way ANOVA on the data from the arrow stimuli (for cued trials, this corresponds to
when the cue occurred); and for Experiment 3, the firstExperiment 1 revealed that the reaction times were sig-
nificantly different across conditions (reward, punish- ten 1.5 s periods of each trial were used (T1–T10), begin-
ning with the cue. The time courses for the three experi-ment, and neutral) [F(2,10)  7.5, p  0.05], with post
hoc two-tailed t tests revealing faster responses to re- ments are shown in Figure 2. Specifically, the ANOVAs
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Table 2. Summary of Experiment 3 Questionnaire Ratings
Ratingb
Questiona (Mean  SD)
Did you care more about winning/losing money for the blue or the yellow cue trials? (1  cared 5  2
much more during blue cue trials; 7  cared much more during yellow cue trials)
How much control did you feel you had over whether you won or lost money for the yellow cue 4  1
trials? (1  no control; 7  complete control)
How much control did you feel you had over whether you won or lost money for the blue cue 2  2
trials? (1  no control; 7  complete control)
Do you think there was a pattern to the “winning” answers for the yellow cue trials? (1  no, I 5  2
think it was just random; 7  yes, I definitely think there was a pattern)
Do you think there was a pattern to the “winning” answers for the blue cue trials? (1  no, I think 3  1
it was just random; 7  yes, I definitely think there was a pattern)
a Blue cue trials, no-choice trials; yellow cue trials, choice trials.
b Ratings are on a 7 point scale; 2 subjects did not complete the questionnaire, so results are based on ratings from the other 9 subjects.
revealed no significant main effects or interactions for paradigm with perceptually distinct but conceptually
similar task demands and similar timing parameters be-Experiments 1 and 2 at a threshold of p  0.01. Robust
activation was found only in Experiment 3 [main effect tween response choices and displays (Delgado et al.,
2000, 2003). As in these papers, the largest and mostof time, F(9,90)  5.22, p  0.00001 for left caudate;
F(9,90)  7.96, p  0.0000001 for right caudate], and reliable difference between reward and punishment re-
sponses occurs 6 s after the presentation of the rewardwithin this experiment, only for the choice condition
[cue  time interaction, F(9,90)  6.57, p  0.000001 or punishment outcome (time period T7). A two-tailed
paired t test performed on the choice condition data atfor left caudate; F(9,90)  4.77, p  0.0001 for right
caudate]. This suggests that the caudate nucleus is only T7 (6.0–7.5 s after outcome presentation) showed that
reward activity was significantly greater than the punish-strongly recruited when there is a perceived contingency
between the subject’s actions and the outcome. ment activity for both left [t(10)  3.1, p  0.05] and
right [t(10)  4.2, p  0.01] caudate.As Figure 3 shows, the time course patterns for the
choice condition differ between reward and punishment Results from Voxel-Wise ANOVAs
In addition to analyzing the caudate activation acrossoutcomes. After an anticipatory rise between the cue
and the outcome, the response peaks and then rapidly experiments, we also performed voxel-wise repeated
measures ANOVAs on each of the three functional im-decreases below baseline for punishment trials, while
there is a more sustained response for reward trials. aging data sets to confirm that this more typical ap-
proach yields findings in the striatum that are consistentThis follows the pattern observed in a gambling-like
Figure 2. Activation in the Caudate Nucleus
across the Three Experiments
Throughout, each time period (T1, T2, etc.)
represents 1.5 s. The green arrows indicate
the time period at which the outcome was
revealed. The yellow arrows indicate the time
period at which an anticipatory cue was dis-
played, for those trials when one was present.
The red stars indicate the time period at
which the subjects made a button press re-
sponse.
Top: Activation in the left and right caudate
nucleus, defined by reported peak activation
Talairach coordinates (Delgado, et al., 2000).
In Experiment 1, robust activity was not ob-
served for any of the conditions (reward, pun-
ishment, and neutral).
Middle: In Experiment 2, robust activity oc-
curred neither for cued nor uncued condi-
tions.
Bottom: In Experiment 3, robust activity oc-
curred for the choice but not the no-choice
condition. Activity for the reward and punish-
ment conditions differed significantly at time
period T7 (6.0–7.5 s after the onset of the
reward or punishment stimulus) for the choice
condition for both left and right caudate.
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Figure 3. Activity in Caudate Voxels Showing a Cue Condition  Time Interaction in Experiment 3
Each time period (T1–T10) represents 1.5 s. Green arrows indicate the time period at which the outcome was revealed. The yellow arrows
indicate the time period at which an anticipatory cue was displayed, for those trials when one was present. The red stars indicate the time
period at which the subjects made a button press response.
Left: Both the left and right caudate nucleus voxel clusters display a cue condition (choice versus no-choice) by time interaction at p  0.0001
in Experiment 3.
Right: Time courses of the caudate voxel clusters reveal that activity is significantly greater for the choice condition than the no-choice
condition for both left and right caudate nucleus.
with our a priori VOI analysis, and to identify voxel clus- ment)  time interaction [F(9,90)  4.35, p  0.0001]
and both left and right caudate showed a main effectters that are modulated by affective stimuli without re-
quiring assumptions about where those regions would of time [F(9,90)  4.35, p  0.0001], while no caudate
voxels showed these effects in Experiments 1 and 2be. As in the a priori VOI analysis, the ANOVAs used
subject as a random factor, and time period, valence, (Table 3). These results reinforce the findings from the
a priori caudate analysis.and cue (except for Experiment 1) as within-subjects
factors. The time periods used in these analyses were The absence of a significant valence by time effect in
the nucleus accumbens is worth noting, since this areathe same as those described in the previous section.
These ANOVAs do not require assumptions about the is a key projection site of dopaminergic neurons and is
a major region in the brain’s reward circuit (Koob, 1992).shape of the hemodynamic response.
Striatal Activation. Striatal activation clusters identi- Signal dropout, due to the proximity of this region to air
and fluid cavities, may be one factor in interpreting ourfied using the voxel-wise ANOVAs for each experiment,
with a contiguity threshold of four voxels, are shown in null result. To systematically assess the degree of drop-
out across our three studies, we compared overall meanTable 3. In further support of the observation that the
caudate nucleus was more strongly activated when sub- intensity in the nucleus accumbens [Talairach coordi-
nates: (x  12, y  8, z  8) and (x  12, y  8, z jects thought that their responses determined the out-
come, caudate activation clusters showing a cue condi- 8); cf. Zink et al., 2003] to the voxels used in our a
priori analysis of caudate activation for each of our stud-tion by time interaction were identified bilaterally for the
data from Experiment 3 [F(9,90)  4.35, p  0.0001] ies. The nucleus accumbens to caudate intensity ratio
was 0.42 for Experiment 1, 0.46 for Experiment 2, and(Figure 3). The Talairach coordinates with the maximal
F-value for each activation cluster were (x  12, y  0.52 for Experiment 3. This indicates that there was a
similar degree of dropout in this area in each of our11, z  8) and (x  9, y  16, z  4), which are each
only about one voxel away from the caudate coordinates experiments. However, our relative dropout does appear
to be greater than in a previous study from our lab inused in our a priori analysis. As can be seen from the
time courses in Figure 3, these clusters were strongly which there was a significant valence by time effect
in the ventral striatum using a 2-shot spiral scanningactivated for the choice condition but showed only a
very weak response for the no-choice condition. sequence (Delgado et al., 2000). In that data set, the
ratio of intensity in the ventral striatal ROI compared toAdditionally, in Experiment 3, the left caudate nucleus
showed a valence condition (reward versus punish- an ROI found in the caudate nucleus was 0.81.
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Table 3. Striatal Clusters of Activation
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3
Talairach Talairach Talairach
Region of Coordinates Region of Coordinates Region of Coordinates
Activation (x, y, z) Activation (x, y, z) Activation (x, y, z)
Main effect of time putamen (L) 20, 3, 8 putamen (L) 20, 1, 4 caudate nucleus (L) 12, 12, 4
caudate nucleus (R) 8, 0, 12
Valence  time - - caudate nucleus (L) 16, 12, 4
interaction
putamen (R) 17, 8, 1
Cue type  time N/A putamen (R) 12, 3, 14 caudate nucleus/anterior 12, 11, 8
interaction thalamus (L)
caudate nucleus (R) 9, 16, 4
Note: Talairach coordinates in bold are within 2 voxels of the coordinates used in the a priori analysis of caudate activation.
All activation clusters were identified at a significance threshold of p  0.0001 and a contiguity threshold of four voxels.
Additional Brain Regions Showing a Cue Type by Time
Interaction in Experiment 3. A montage displaying voxel
clusters showing a cue type by time interaction in Exper-
iment 3, at a significance threshold of p  0.0001 and
a contiguity threshold of 4 voxels, is depicted in Figure
4. In addition to the caudate bilaterally, the anterior cin-
gulate gyrus (x  3, y  30, z  40), the right superior
frontal gyrus (x  31, y  52, z  16), and the right
middle frontal gyrus (x  28, y  44, z  0) showed
greater activation in the choice condition than the no-
choice condition. The cuneus (x  5, y  76, z  28)
and the left middle temporal gyrus (x  50, y  50,
z  4) showed less activation in the choice condition
than in the no-choice condition. Other than in the cau-
date nucleus, none of the voxels from these activation
clusters also showed significant valence by time effects
at a threshold of p 0.0001 in this experiment, indicating
that activation in these regions may reflect non-reward-
related differences between the two conditions, such
as additional executive control necessary to perform
the task in the choice condition.
Brain Regions Showing a Valence by Time Interaction.
To find regions that showed differential responses to
reward and punishment feedback across experiments,
we used an overlap function to isolate voxels that
showed a valence by time interaction at a threshold of
p  0.0001 in all three experiments. Neutral trials were
excluded in the ANOVA for Experiment 1 since there
were no neutral trials in the other two experiments. The
voxels where a significant valence by time interaction
was found in each of the experiments are shown in
Figure 5.
Only one region showing a valence by time interaction
in all three experiments was identified using this overlap
analysis, a right lingual cluster that covered 5 voxels
(Figure 6). The Talairach coordinates for the peak
F-value (averaged across the three experiments) are (x
12, y69, z 4). As can be seen from the time courses
in Figure 6, when there is no cue (as in Experiment 1,
Figure 4. Brain Regions Showing a Cue Type by Time Interactionand the uncued condition for Experiment 2), the hemo-
in Experiment 3
dynamic response to punishment is very weak, while
Voxel clusters displaying a cue type by time interaction in Experi-there is a much larger response to reward. When a cue
ment 3 are shown (p  0.0001; contiguity threshold of 4 voxels).
is present (as in Experiment 3 and the cued condition Each activation cluster shown, except for the cuneus and the left
for Experiment 2) there is a rise at the onset of the cue, middle temporal gyrus, displays a greater response in the choice
condition than in the no-choice condition.followed by a differentiation of response following the
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mined whether they won or lost money; neither pseudo-
randomly presented rewards and punishments nor time-
locked anticipation of the rewards and punishments was
enough to drive such a response. It should be noted
that in all three experiments, subjects were told that a
failure to make a response would result in a monetary
fine, so in a sense, the reward was dependent on making
a response in all cases. However, in the first two experi-
ments presented here, responding to the oddball stimuli
presented no difficulty to the subjects, as evidenced by
their low error rates. Thus there was a very low probabil-
ity of not getting a reward due to failure to respond
appropriately. In contrast, in Experiment 3, responding
“appropriately” was much more difficult; in the choice
condition, only 50% of the time did the subjects guess
“correctly” and win money. This is not to say that deci-
sion-making is the key component in driving caudate
activation. Caudate activation has also been elicited in
paradigms requiring rapid target detection in order to
get a reward or avoid a punishment (Knutson et al., 2000,
2001a, 2001b). While these paradigms have surface sim-
ilarities to the no-choice condition in Experiment 3 (a
single button is pressed upon seeing a target, followed
by a feedback display indicating a monetary outcome),
there is an important difference: in the rapid target de-
tection tasks, the outcome is dependent upon speed of
response, whereas in the no-choice condition in Experi-
ment 3, there is no connection between the speed of
response and the outcome. This difference is reflected
in the imaging results from the two tasks: caudate activ-
ity was elicited in the rapid target detection tasks, but
not in the no-choice condition in Experiment 3.
It seems, then, that the caudate nucleus is not acti-
vated by all instrumental tasks (i.e., tasks involving be-
havioral reinforcement), but instead only by those tasks
in which there exists both a perceived connection be-
tween action and outcome and some uncertainty about
whether the action will lead to the desired outcome. This
Figure 5. Brain Regions Showing a Valence by Time Interaction in idea is supported by electrophysiological work done in
Each Experiment monkeys. Specifically, caudate neurons’ activity related
Regions displaying a valence  time period interaction are shown, to saccades to a rewarded location is diminished when
color-coded by experiment (p  0.0001). Colors reflect a significant
all saccade locations are rewarded (Takikawa et al.,effect in the following experiments: red  1 only; yellow  2 only;
2002). Future studies in both animals and humans couldblue  3 only; orange  1 and 2; violet  1 and 3; green  2 and
aim to more narrowly define the key components of3; cyan  1, 2, and 3. The only voxels showing a significant valence
by time period interaction across all three experiments are in the tasks with action-dependent outcomes that elicit striatal
right lingual gyrus. All voxel clusters shown display greater activa- activation, such as the uncertainty or increased motiva-
tion for reward than for punishment. tion inherent in these tasks. The questionnaires that
subjects in Experiment 3 filled out may provide some
insight into this issue. They indicate that caudate activa-
outcome display. Namely, the response to punishment tion was correlated with subjective ratings of control and
falls back to baseline while the response to reward is the impression that there was a pattern to the winning
more sustained. Unlike the response in the caudate nu- answers: both were higher for the choice than the no-
cleus, the response in the lingual gyrus does not differ- choice condition. It may be that these subjective impres-
entiate based on whether there is a perceived con- sions of a task matter more in determining the strength
tingency between the subject’s responses and the of caudate activation than whether the task involves
outcome. instrumental conditioning or Pavlovian (i.e., classical)
conditioning, in which stimulus-reward associations are
Discussion built up through pairing of a conditioned stimulus with
an unconditioned rewarding stimulus.
The main goal of these experiments was to ascertain The findings presented here should help to reconcile
which aspects of affective stimuli drive activity in the differences in caudate activity observed in prior studies.
human striatum. A major finding of this work is that In studies in which the subjects’ decisions (Delgado
the caudate nucleus was robustly activated only when et al., 2000, 2003; Elliott et al., 2000) or reaction time
(Knutson et al., 2000, 2001a, 2001b) determined the out-the subjects thought that their button presses deter-
Neuron
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Figure 6. Activity in the Lingual Gyrus across All Three Experiments
Left: The right lingual gyrus shows an interaction of valence  time at p  0.0001 in all three experiments. Voxels that met this significance
threshold in all three experiments are shown.
Right: The time courses of the activation in the right lingual gyrus region shown on the left are graphed for each experiment. All show a
greater response to reward than punishment. The yellow arrows indicate the time period at which an anticipatory cue was displayed, for those
trials when one was present. The red stars indicate the time period at which the subjects made a button press response. Anticipatory activation
is shown for the conditions in which an anticipatory cue was present: for the cued condition in Experiment 2 and for both conditions in
Experiment 3. This activity then differentiates once the outcome is revealed, indicated by the green arrows.
come, caudate activation has been reported. In studies negative outcome could be used to either reinforce or
weaken the action (Barto, 1995). In the experiments pre-in which the subjects’ responses did not determine the
outcome (Berns et al., 2001; Breiter et al., 2001; McClure sented here, the outcome of each trial was actually fixed,
so learning was impossible. However, other studies haveet al., 2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003) or in which, as in the
first two experiments presented here, only a noneffortful shown that the caudate does indeed play an impor-
tant role in learning. For example, one study found thatresponse was necessary to get a reward (Elliott et al.,
2003), activation in the caudate was not reported. There- the preferred direction of monkeys’ caudate neurons
changed as a function of rewarded direction of eyefore, the caudate appears to be sensitive to reinforce-
ment of action, rather than to rewards per se. That is, movement (Kawagoe et al., 1998). In addition, inactiva-
tion of the caudate and anterior putamen decreasescaudate activation seems to reflect the “goodness” of
actions by differentiating between positive and negative monkeys’ ability to learn new motor sequences (Hiko-
saka, 2002). In humans, the dorsal striatum has beenconsequences. This sort of valuation of action can then
be used to bias future behavior (Montague and Berns, found to be important in habit learning tasks with feed-
back (Packard and Knowlton, 2002).2002).
The sensitivity of the caudate to the contingency be- While this work has focused on caudate activation,
other striatal regions have also been found to be in-tween action and outcome puts it in a prime position to
aid in learning. More specifically, the signal from the volved in processing reward-related information, includ-
ing the ventral striatum and putamen (Berns et al., 2001;caudate associating an action with either a positive or
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Delgado et al., 2000, 2003; Elliott et al., 2000, 2003; cessing differences in the visual stimuli in all of the
Knutson et al., 2001a, 2001b; McClure et al., 2003; experiments; in other words, the lack of caudate activa-
O’Doherty et al., 2003; Pagnoni et al., 2002). The nucleus tion for Experiments 1 and 2 cannot be attributed to
accumbens, a key projection site of dopaminergic neu- subjects’ failure to monitor the incoming stimuli. How-
rons, lies within the ventral striatum and is a major region ever, reward-dependent activity in the lingual gyrus has
in the brain’s reward circuit (Koob, 1992). Yet we did also been reported in several other experiments (Del-
not find significant activation in the nucleus accumbens gado et al., 2003; Elliott et al., 2003). These prior findings
in this work. Our functional data set had more signal may also represent the influence of visual differences
dropout in this area than it did in more dorsal areas of in the feedback displays. However, the possibility also
the brain, which leaves open the possibility that we did exists that lingual activation may reflect retrieval of the
not detect activity in this region that was nevertheless reward-dependent meaning of the visual display. In-
occurring. A human fMRI study showed that the nucleus deed, the lingual gyrus has been shown to be activated
accumbens is more responsive to unpredictable, as op- during visual cue processing associated with high states
posed to predictable, juice rewards (Berns et al., 2001); of arousal, as characterized by skin conductance re-
thus, one might have especially expected to find such sponses (Critchley et al., 2000; Lane et al., 1999; Pat-
activation in our first experiment, in which the rewards terson et al., 2002). In addition, the lingual gyrus in-
and punishments were presented pseudorandomly. creases in activity during recognition of previously
However, there are several methodological differences studied emotionally salient images (Taylor et al., 1998)
between the present and prior work that could explain and words studied in an emotionally negative context
this discrepancy. The study conducted by Berns et al. (Maratos et al., 2001).
(2001) had only one 5 min run in each condition, to In summary, we performed three experiments using
insure maximal unpredictability. It may be that over time, an oddball paradigm to dissociate various factors that
subjects in our experiment found the rewards and pun- might drive reward-dependent activity in the dorsal stri-
ishments more and more predictable as they became atum. We showed robust activity in the caudate nucleus
accustomed to the range of time between each oddball only when subjects believed that their button presses
event. It is also possible that primary rewards such as determined whether they won or lost money. This finding
juice may more strongly activate the nucleus accum- not only reconciles previous seemingly conflicting find-
bens, whereas more abstract, behaviorally dependent ings in the caudate nucleus, but also suggests that com-
secondary rewards, such as winning money for a correct pared to other striatal regions, the way the caudate
response, may more selectively recruit the caudate nu- processes reward-related information may be unique in
cleus. that it is dependent upon an action-reward contingency.
A functional dissociation between dorsal and ventral While the task used in this work did not require subjects
striatum has been suggested by a recent fMRI experi- to gamble their own money, the choice condition in the
ment, in which infrequent distracter stimuli elicited sig- third experiment can be likened to a gambling situation
nificant activation in the caudate nucleus only when the in which a person performs an action that results in
stimuli were behaviorally relevant, in that they potentially either monetary gain or loss. Perhaps it is no coinci-
required a response, but activation in the nucleus ac- dence that real-life gambling situations require action:
cumbens was not dependent on behavioral relevance a lever must be pulled on a slot machine, a coating
(Zink et al., 2003). A functional dissociation between rubbed off a lottery ticket, etc. In a sense, every action
ventral and dorsal striatum is also supported by re- is a gamble, potentially leading to a positive or negative
search on rat striatum. For example, it has been pro- consequence. An awareness that the caudate may play
posed that the dorsal striatum mediates consummatory a distinctive role in processing action-contingent re-
aspects of reward-related behavior, while the ventral ward-related information furthers our understanding of
striatum has more influence on appetitive aspects of
the mechanisms by which humans interpret and learn
behavior (Robbins and Everitt, 1992). More recently, do-
about the consequences of their actions.
pamine release in the dorsal striatum has been found
to increase during drug-seeking behavior contingently Experimental Procedures
linked with a cocaine-associated conditioned stimulus,
but not when the conditioned stimulus presentation was Subjects
Thirty-eight healthy, right-handed volunteers participated in thesenot contingent upon the rats’ lever presses (Ito et al.,
experiments; 12 of these volunteers participated in Experiment 1,2002); however, the reverse pattern occurred in the nu-
13 participated in Experiment 2, and 13 participated in Experiment 3.cleus accumbens, with the noncontingent presentations
Due to excessive head motion for two of the subjects and equipmentincreasing dopamine release, but not the contingent
malfunction for a third, data from three subjects were not used in
presentations (Ito et al., 2000). the analyses, leaving 11 subjects with analyzable data in Experiment
While we expected to find reward-related activity in 1 (8 female, 3 male, mean age 22  3 SD), 13 in Experiment 2 (7
the striatum, we unexpectedly found that the lingual female, 6 male, mean age 23  3 SD), and 11 in Experiment 3 (4
female, 7 male, mean age 23  4 SD). All subjects filled out a briefgyrus showed a differential response to reward and pun-
questionnaire based on the South Oaks Gambling Screen (Lesieurishment in all three experiments. This finding could sim-
and Blume, 1987) to insure that no subject was excessive in gam-ply reflect a visual epiphenomenon, in that the lingual
bling behavior. All subjects gave informed consent according to thegyrus may be responding to differences in color between
Institutional Review Board at the University of Pittsburgh.
the green arrow indicating reward versus the red arrow
indicating punishment, or differences in direction of the Experimental Task
arrows. At the very least, then, the differential activity An “oddball” task was used in which a standard habituating stimulus
(a purple square) was presented once every 1500 ms for a duration ofin the lingual gyrus indicates that subjects were pro-
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500 ms, interrupted with infrequent “oddball” stimuli. These oddball Data Acquisition
Subjects were scanned using a conventional 1.5 Tesla GE Signastimuli could be a green upward arrow, a red downward arrow, or,
in Experiment 1 only, a blue sideways arrow. The subjects were whole-body scanner and standard radio frequency coil. Structural
images were collected using a standard T1-weighted pulse se-informed that each time the green upward arrow appeared, they
had won $1.50, while each time a red downward arrow appeared, quence, in 36 contiguous slices (3.75  3.75  3.8 mm voxels)
parallel to the AC-PC line. Oblique axial functional images werethey had lost $0.75. The blue sideways arrow indicated a neutral
trial, in which the subject neither won nor lost money. For the first collected at the location of the middle twenty of the structural slices,
using a one-shot spiral pulse sequence (TR  1500 ms, TE  35two experiments, the subjects’ task was simply to press the first
finger button on a response glove each time they saw either type ms, FOV  24 cm, flip angle  70).
of arrow. Since the button press occurred after the reward-relevant
stimulus was presented, the subjects knew that their response did Data Analysis
not affect the trial outcome. However, to make sure that they consis- The NeuroImaging Software package (NIS 3.5), developed at the
tently responded on each trial, they were told that they would be University of Pittsburgh and Princeton University, was used to ana-
fined $1.00 for every arrow they failed to respond to. Trials on which lyze the fMRI data, along with the graphical computing environment,
the subject did not respond were not included in the analysis. While Functional Imaging Software Widgets (fiswidgets; Fissell et al.,
lying in the scanner, subjects viewed stimuli projected onto a mirror. 2003). Images were reconstructed and corrected for subject motion
Stimuli were presented and behavioral data were acquired using with Automated Image Registration (AIR 3.08; Woods et al., 1992).
Psyscope software on a Macintosh computer (MacWhinney et al., Runs in which motion exceeded 3 mm or 3 in any direction were
1997). not used in analysis. The images were detrended to adjust for scan-
For Experiment 1, each session consisted of 7–12 runs of 12 trials ner drift within runs. The structural images of each subject were
each, for a total of 84–144 trials per subject. Trial type order was stripped to remove the skull and coregistered to a common refer-
pseudorandom, with the constraints that overall the numbers of ence brain, chosen from among the subjects (Woods et al., 1993).
reward, punishment, and neutral trials were equal, and that no more Functional images were transformed into the same common space,
than 3 events of a given trial type could occur in a row. Oddballs normalized by a mean scaling of each image to match global mean
occurred once every 10.5–19.5 s. image intensities across subjects, and smoothed using a three-
In Experiment 2, a yellow circle appeared 3 s before the arrow dimensional Gaussian filter (8 mm FWHM) to account for anatomical
stimulus on half of the trials, serving as an anticipatory cue indicating differences between subjects. This set of data was then analyzed
when the arrow would appear. The cue did not provide any informa- statistically. To visualize the data, the AFNI software program was
tion about the valence of the upcoming arrow, and no response was used (Cox, 1996); this program was also used to warp the data into
made to it. In addition, there were no neutral trials in this experiment. Talairach space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988).
Each session consisted of 12 runs of 11 trials each, for a total of For each experiment a repeated-measures ANOVA was performed
132 trials. Trial length ranged from 13.5–19.5 s. Trials in which a on the coregistered functional data in the two voxels representing
subject did not respond or responded to both the cue and the peak activation reported in the left and right caudate nucleus in
arrow were not included in the analysis. Trial type order was again previously published work from our laboratory (Delgado et al., 2000).
pseudorandom, with the constraints that overall the number of trials The Talairach coordinates corresponding to these voxels are (x 
in the four conditions (cued reward, uncued reward, cued punish- 12, y  15, z  7) and (x  11, y  16, z  7). For Experiment 1,
ment, uncued punishment) were equal, and that no more than 3 subject was a random factor and trial valence (reward, punishment,
events of a given trial type could occur in a row. or neutral) and time (1.5 s time periods, T1–T7) were within-subjects
In Experiment 3, a cue appeared 3 s before the arrow on each factors. Note that although trial length varied, only the first 10.5 s
trial, and the subjects responded when the cue appeared, rather of each trial (beginning with the presentation of the arrow) were
than when the arrow appeared. For half of the trials, this cue was analyzed. For Experiment 2, the ANOVA had subject as a random
a light blue circle, and for the other half, a yellow circle. Subjects factor and cue condition (uncued or cued), trial valence (reward or
punishment), and time (1.5 s time periods, T1–T9) as within-subjectswere instructed to simply press the thumb key on the response
factors. For this experiment, the first 13.5 s of each trial were ana-glove upon seeing a blue circle. They were told that in this condition
lyzed, beginning with the time period 3 s before the presentation of(the “no-choice” condition) they had no control over which type of
the arrow. This is when the cue appeared for trials in which a cuearrow would be presented. In contrast, the subjects were instructed
was present. For Experiment 3, the ANOVA was performed withthat when they saw the yellow circle, they should choose between
subject as a random factor and cue condition (choice or no-choice),responding by pressing the first-finger key or second-finger key on
trial valence (reward or punishment), and time (1.5 s time periods,the response glove (the “choice” condition). They were told that if
T1–T10) as within-subjects factors. The first 15 s of each trial werethey “guessed the correct button” they would win and see the up-
analyzed, beginning with the time period when the cue stimulusward green arrow, while if they guessed incorrectly, they would lose
appeared, 3 s before the arrow stimulus appeared.and see the red downward arrow. In this way, the perception of
Additionally, a voxel-wise repeated-measures ANOVA was per-contingency between action and outcome was manipulated. In real-
formed on all the coregistered data for each experiment, with theity, the trials were fixed such that half of the trials were reward trials
same factors as in the a priori analysis of the caudate voxels. Forand half were punishment. For all trials in which no response was
Experiment 1, a second ANOVA was performed excluding neutralmade, a screen with three white dashes was shown instead of the
trials, for more direct comparison with the other two experiments.arrow stimulus. To insure that subjects would respond consistently,
Activation clusters were defined as regions with four or more contig-they were told that if they did not respond on a given trial, they would
uous voxels showing a significant effect; this contiguity thresholdlose $1.00. No-response errors were excluded from the analyses.
serves as a precaution against type 1 errors (Forman et al., 1995).Each session consisted of 12 runs of 11 trials each, for a total of
The time courses from such clusters located in the striatum were132 trials. Trial length ranged from 13.5 to 21.0 s. Trials were ordered
plotted and analyzed. A conjunction analysis was performed to iso-pseudorandomly, with the constraints that there were equal num-
late voxels showing a valence by time interaction at a significancebers of the four conditions (choice reward, no-choice reward, choice
threshold of p  0.001 in all three experiments; in this analysis, thepunishment, no-choice punishment), and that no more than 3 events
Experiment 1 ANOVA excluding neutral trials was used. The timeof a given trial type could occur in a row. As in the other experiments,
course from the resulting conjunction voxels was also plotted andthe subjects earned $50 by the end of the experiment. At the end of
analyzed.the experiment, subjects filled out a brief Likert-scale questionnaire
asking their impressions of the task, including whether they felt they
had more control when responding to the yellow circle or to the Acknowledgments
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